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by Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
This article previously appeared
in
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Volume 14, September 2001, Number 3
The Soviets entered Afghanistan in late December 1979 to suppress a growing
insurgency and to replace an out-of-control communist regime with another communist,
pro-Moscow government. The Soviet government realized too late that they were
then stuck in the middle of a civil war fighting guerrilla forces on some of
the world's toughest terrain. The Soviets had planned to merely prop up the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and let the Afghan communist forces
fight the Mujahideen guerrillas. Instead, the Soviets found their forces increasingly
drawn into the battle-a nonlinear, unconventional battle which they were ill
equipped or trained for.
The Soviet-Afghan War was primarily fought on the tactical level, but the
strategic focus was a struggle by each side to strangle the others logistics
lifeline. The Mujahideen and Soviets spent a great deal of time and energy defending
their logistics network and attacking the other's. The Mujahideen targeted the
Soviet lines of communication-the crucial road network over which the Soviet
and DRA supplies had to move and ambushed convoys or cut off roads at critical
mountain passes. The Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was done in two
phases. From 1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate Mujahideen support
in the countryside.
Early in the war, Mujahideen logistics requirements were fairly simple and
primarily concerned with ammunition resupply and evacuating the wounded. The
rural population willingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen-who were
usually neighbors. The Soviets bombed rural villages and granaries, destroyed
irrigation systems and crops, destroyed herds and launched sweeps through the
countryside-conscripting young men and destroying the village infrastructure.
The Soviet leadership believed Mao Tse Tung's dictum that the guerrilla lives
in the population like a fish in water. They decided "to kill the fish
by draining off the water".(1)
Afghanistan became a nation of refugees as more than seven million people
left their farms and fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to the cities
of Afghanistan. The Mujahideen, who were used to living off the good will of
the rural population, now had to transport rations as well as ammunition from
Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan.
The Mujahideen responded by establishing a series of supply depots, transfer
depots and forward supply points logistics bases inside Afghanistan. These logistics
facilities made it easier to provision the Mujahideen, but these facilities
also had to be defended. The second Soviet phase was to find and destroy the
Mujahideen logistics facilities. The odds are stacked against a defending guerrilla
force since the attacker has the initiative, armored vehicles, air power and
the bulk of artillery and fire power. The Mujahideen tried to offset this with
a wise use of terrain and prepared defenses.(2)
Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province in the eastern
part of Afghanistan. It was located four kilometers from the Pakistan border
and 15 kilometers from the major Pakistani forward supply base at Miram Shah.
Zhawar began as a Mujahideen training center and expanded into a major Mujahideen
combat base for supply, training and staging. The base was located inside a
canyon surrounded by Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar mountains. The canyon opens
to the southeast facing Pakistan.
As the base expanded, Mujahideen used bulldozers and explosives to dig at least
11 major tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of Sodyaki Ghar Mountain.
Some of these huge tunnels reached 500 meters and contained a hotel, a mosque,
arms depots and repair shops, a garage, a medical point, a radio center and
a kitchen. A gasoline generator provided power to the tunnels and the hotel's
video player. This impressive base became a mandatory stop for visiting journalists,
dignitaries and other "war tourists". Apparently, this construction
effort also interfered with construction of fighting positions and field fortifications.
The Mujahideen "Zhawar Regiment", some 500 strong, was permanently
based there. This regiment was primarily responsible for logistics support of
the mobile groups fighting in the area and for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK)
groups in other provinces of Afghanistan. Due to its primary logistic function,
the regiment was not fully equipped for combat, but was a credible combat force.
The regiment was responsible for local defense and for stopping infiltration
of Khad and KGB agents between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They manned checkpoints
along the road to screen identification papers. The regiment had a Soviet D30
122mm howitzer, two tanks (captured from the DRA post at Bori in 1983), some
six -barrel Chinese-manufactured BM-12 multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and some
machine guns and small arms. A Mujahideen air defense company defended Zhawar
with five ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 antiaircraft heavy machine guns. These 14.5mm
air defense machine guns were positioned on high ground around the base.(3)
Defense of the approaches to the base was the responsibility of Mujahideen groups
from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the Islamic Revolutionary
Movement (IRMA), and the two Islamic Party factions (HIH and HIK).(4)
There were six major Mujahideen supply routes into Afghanistan.(5)
Twenty percent of all the Mujahideen supplies came through the Zhawar route.(6)
The overall Mujahideen commander of Paktia Province, including Zhawar base,
was Jalaluddin Haqani, who was a member of HIK.
In September 1985, the DRA 12th Infantry Division from Gardez, with elements
of the 37th and 38th Commando Brigades moved from Gardez circuitously through
Jaji Maidan to Khost since the direct route through the Sata-Kandow pass had
been under Mujahideen control since 1981. This force joined elements of the
25th Infantry Division which was garrisoned in Khost. Shahnawaz Tani(7)
commanded this mixed force. The DRA military units had their full complement
of weapons and equipment, but desertion, security details and other duties kept
their units chronically understrength. Since the DRA could not mobilize sufficient
force from one regiment or division, they formed composite forces for these
missions.(8)
Late one September afternoon, the DRA force began an infantry attack supported
by heavy artillery fire and air strikes on Bori, which is northeast of Zhawar
(Map First Battle of Zhawar). Zhawar was not prepared for this attack since
most of its major commanders, including Haqani, were on a pilgrimage to Mecca
(the Haj). The DRA recaptured Bori and drove on to Zhawar. The Mujahideen
reacted by positioning an 80-man group to block the ridge on the eastern slope
of the Moghulgai mountains which form the eastern wall of the Zhawar base. The
DRA force arrived at night and during the night fighting lost two APCs and four
trucks. Eventually, the DRA became discouraged, withdrew and returned to Khost.(9)
Mujahideen from the nomad Kochi tribe (led by Malang Kochi and Dadmir Kochi)
and Gorbez Mujahideen, recaptured Bori.
The DRA then launched its next attempt from the town of Tani. They recaptured
the town of Lezhi from the Mujahideen and killed Commander Mawlawi Ahmad Gul.
The major Mujahideen commanders returned to Pakistan from the Haj on that day
(4 September) and hurried north to Zhawar to take command. The Mujahideen from
Lezhi retreated south while a 20-man Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow
pass. The pass is dominated by a high peak which is capped with a thick rock
slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which the Mujahideen improved. The cave
could accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air strikes. The Mujahideen
also dug communications trenches so that they could quickly reoccupy their fighting
positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions dominated the Tani plain
and were well positioned to stop any infantry attack.
The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no headway. The infantry
would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop. Then massed air and artillery
would pound the area. The infantry would again try to attack, but would again
be stopped immediately. The procedure would then repeat itself, but the DRA
made no headway during its ten-day attack. After ten days, the DRA called in
heavy Soviet airstrikes which continuously hit the mountain top. The thick rock
slab began to sway and rock. The Mujahideen were afraid that the rock slab might
shift and crush their cave, so they finally withdrew. It was 14 September 1985.
As the Mujahideen fell back, the DRA established observation posts on high
ground and started adjusting air and artillery strikes. This gave the tactical
advantage to the DRA and their infantry moved through the pass. The Mujahideen
rear guard desperately engaged the DRA infantry with machine gun fire and aircraft
with ZGU machine guns. The DRA continued to advance and seized the high ground
of Tor Kamar. Tor Kamar is within a kilometer of Zhawar base and well within
the range of machine gun fire. The DRA thought that the Mujahideen did not have
any heavy weapons and became careless and bunched their forces on the high ground.
Two Mujahideen, Alam Jan and Muhammad Salim, were former tank commanders in
the DRA. In the late afternoon, they moved their two tanks out of the caves
and swung north into firing positions. They opened fire and their first rounds
destroyed a DRA observation post as an artillery spotting scope and soldiers
went flying. The Mujahideen tankers then traversed to the second observation
post and destroyed it with their next rounds. Then they opened up on the other
DRA soldiers.
The mauled DRA force fell back and maneuvered through the "bird droppings"
saddle(10)
to the east side of Tamberi Ghar. The Mujahideen countered with blocking positions
which they held for five days. Haji Amanullah Khan and Ismail Khan played major
roles in the fighting at this stage. The DRA Commander, General Tani moved his
CP into the Many Kandow pass and tried to reinvigorate the DRA assault, but
the Mujahideen held. During the fighting, the Mujahideen shot down a helicopter,
but lost a major commander--Mawlawi Fathullah. Mujahideen reinforcements, including
Commander Mawlawi Arsalah, arrived from Pakistan and as far away as Jalalabad
and Urgun. The DRA were getting chronically low on men and supplies and, after
42 days of fighting, General Tani broke contact and conducted a night withdrawal.
Mujahideen casualties were 106 KIA and 321 WIA. DRA and Soviet losses were heavy,
but their numbers are unknown since they evacuated their dead and wounded. Zhawar
was a symbol of Mujahideen invincibility in the border area and the Soviets
and DRA felt that they had to destroy this myth. The Mujahideen were convinced
that Zhawar was impregnable and failed to take some basic security precautions.
September-October and April-May are historically the best months in Afghanistan
for campaigning, since the weather is reasonable and the roads are dry. August-September
was also the time of the Haj and the senior leadership of the area
all made this religious pilgrimage together. Consequently, the senior leadership
was absent when the battle started and other Mujahideen commanders had to take
command of the battle.
Field fortifications around Zhawar were neglected and incomplete. The excellent
field fortifications at the mouth of the Manay Kandow pass bought time to improve
the other fortifications The complacent attitude almost cost the Mujahideen
their base. Only the unexpected appearance of Mujahideen armor at a crucial
minute prevented a DRA victory. The Mujahideen were able to move men and supplies
from Miram Shah in Pakistan throughout the battle. The DRA apparently made no
attempt to impede access by deploying scatterable mines against the route.
In February 1986, during the XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, General Secretary Gorbachev informed the delegates that the Soviet Government
had worked out a plan with the Afghan Government to conduct a phased withdrawal
of Soviet forces. The plan would immediately be put into effect after the political
situation stabilized. The Soviet High Command issued orders to their forces
to not get involved in direct combat when possible, but to emphasize security
missions, guarding lines of communication and important installations. Simultaneously,
they adopted additional measures to strengthen the DRA forces. The Soviets felt
that the DRA should now take the leading combat role against the Mujahideen
and urged the DRA to again attack Zhawar.(11)
The DRA Ministry of Defense decided to destroy Zhawar. General of the Army Varrenikov(12)
approved the decision and the high command developed the plan for a combined
operation.(13)
The plan committed 54 under-strength DRA maneuver battalions plus DRA artillery
and aviation to the assault.(14)
The 7th Infantry Division ( 2nd Army Corps) from Kandahar, the 8th Infantry
Division (1st Army Corps) from Kabul, the 14th Infantry Division (3rd Army Corps)
from Gazni, the 25th Infantry Division (3rd Army Corps) from Khost, the 38th
Commando Brigade, and the 666th Air Assault Regiment "Commando" (3rd
Army Corps) from Khost were committed to the fight.
The commander of the 3rd Afghan Army Corps, General-Major Mohammad Asef Delavar,
was appointed the leader of the Afghan ground forces in this operation.(15)
Deputy Minister of Defense General-Lieutenant Nabi Azimi was the overall commander
of the Afghan Group of Forces. His adviser was Deputy to the Senior Military
Adviser for Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.(16)
Azimi and Trofimenko planned the offensive. They constituted an eastern combat
group comprised of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions and the 666th Air Assault
Regiment. They also constituted a western combat group consisting of the 8th
and 25th Infantry Divisions.(17)
The 38th Commando Brigade was committed to make a an air assault onto Dawri
Gar mountain which rose 3,600 meters above sea level and towered over Zhawar.
The commando group had little experience in air assault missions, and the first
lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise as the ground assault began. (See
Map Plan for Zhawar 2)
On the 28th of February, government forces, covered by Soviet aviation, began
to move out of Gardez to the combat zone. (See Map Prelude to Zhawar 2). Their
movement was aided by two Soviet battalions(18)
which occupied the dominant terrain between Kharzun (Mirazi Kalay)and Matwarkh.
However, when units of the Afghan force arrived in Matwarkh region, they ceased
further movement and stayed there for about a month, simply marking time.
Taking advantage of this passive government force, the Mujahideen began to launch
shelling attacks against them. The Afghan forces took casualties, but did not
move forward. The operation began to show signs of breaking down.(19)
The 25th Infantry Division had moved out of Khost and after engaging the Mujahideen
and looting and destroying the villages of Sekan Dara, Kot Kalay, Chine Kalay
and Seto Kalay, moved to secure the Naray pass so the composite DRA force could
move into the Khost valley. The weather was wet snow mixed with rain and a strong
wind. After several days, the composite force moved into the valley and prepared
for the offensive.(20)
The 7th Infantry Division was in the east with the 14th Infantry Division following
and the 8th Infantry Division was in the west with the 25th Infantry Division
following. Sometime around midnight on 2nd of April, the DRA began a two-hour
artillery and aviation preparation of the target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter
transport ships flew from Khost airfield to insert the initial assault group
of the 38th Commando Brigade. The commandos landed without opposition, but the
ground assault ran into immediate, heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending
Dawri Gar mountain. The ground advance was forced to halt.
The command post for the operation had moved from Khost to Tani and was in radio
contact with the initial air assault group.(21)
Despite all the Mujahideen fire, the air assault group commander reported that
the firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early
morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern slope
of Dawri Gar mountain. "Do you see the round?" they asked the commandos.
"Yes, we see it. It's about 15 kilometers from us" they replied. The
DRA fired another illumination round five kilometers further away on the southern
side of Dawri Gar mountain. "Do you see the round?" the command post
again asked the commandos. "Yes, we see it. It's about ten kilometers from
us" they replied. The commandos had landed some five kilometers inside
Pakistan, beyond the base at Zhawar! The command post informed the commandos
of the fact. The insertion group commander quietly answered "I understand.
We will withdraw." But after an hour he reported that he was surrounded
and locked in combat.(22)
The air assault was botched and someone, probably Generals Azimi and Trofimenko,
made it much worse. They committed the rest of the brigade to combat-not onto
the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone, which was well-populated with Mujahideen,
but onto the open areas around Zhawar itself. (See Map Zhawar 2)
Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in the Zadran area when he saw approximately 20
transport helicopters flying over. He radioed the commanders at Zhawar and warned
them. He expected that the helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After
his radio message, he saw another group of helicopters, including some heavy
transport helicopters, flying the same direction. These were escorted by jet
fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawar had 700-800 Mujahideen
combatants, plus air defense forces, at the time. However Jalaluddin Haqani,
the Zhawar Commander, was at Miram Shah. Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information
separately to Jalaluddin Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar.(23)
The usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a Mujahideen base was to pound
the area heavily with air strikes and then follow the air strikes with air assault
landings, artillery fire and a ground advance to link up with the air assault
forces. The air strike gave the Mujahideen commanders warning, reaction time
and a solid indicator where the attack would go. In this case, the Mujahideen
were caught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to
tip them off and the helicopters landed the rest of the 38th Commando Brigade
on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. There were 15 helicopters in
the first lift which landed at 0700 hours. More lifts followed to get the entire
brigade on the ground. The first two helicopters landed on Spin Khwara plain.
Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border. Most
of the helicopters landed on the high ground to the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen
gunners destroyed many helicopters while they were on the ground. Following
the air assault, Soviet jet aircraft bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions.
Mujahideen air defense was not very effective against these aircraft.
Instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bombers and close-air
support aircraft, the Mujahideen went on the offensive and attacked the landing
zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and captured many of the DRA
commandos. Mujahideen reinforcements moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar
and took the commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two
forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured
530 commandos from the 38th Brigade.(24)
Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made ordnance runs on the caves.(25)
Since the caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, the Soviet aircraft overflew
Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with the smart weapons.
Smart missiles hit the first western cave and killed 18 Mujahideen outright.
Smart missiles hit the second western cave and collapsed the cave opening trapping
some 150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long and used as
the radio transmission bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just
arrived from Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave.(26)
Soviet bombers followed the attack of the aircraft with conventional ordnance.
They dropped tons of bombs and, in so doing, blasted away the rubble blocking
the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen escaped. The battle for the remaining
landing zones continued. There was one group of commandos on high ground who
held out for three days before they were finally overrun.(27)
The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one of the commando battalions managed
to exifiltrate and lead 24 of the commandos to the safety of their own forces.
It took eight days. Of the 32 helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight
survived.(28)
The 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions were in the corps first echelon. They tried
to link up with the already destroyed air assault-force. In the course of three
days, they shot up their entire supply of ammunition and lost control. At the
end of the 9th of April, these divisions pulled back to their start points.
The 25th Infantry Division, located in the second echelon, covered the western
flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear area.(29)
The 14th Infantry Division covered the eastern flank. The DRA had regarrisoned
Lezhi since Zhawar One and continued to fight for the possession of the Manay
Kandow Pass for some ten days following the air landing. The Mujahideen attacked
the DRA LOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay
Kandow checked their advance.(30)
General Varrenikov sent a message to the Soviet Minister of Defense in which
he criticized the leadership of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry Divisions and
the 3rd Corps Commander. He presented various alibis (weather, length of campaign,
poor intelligence) and outlined his plan to reinforce the effort with three
DRA regiments, a DRA spetsnaz battalion and six Soviet battalions. He noted
General Azimi's replacement as operations commander and requested time to resupply
and prepare the force to resume the offensive. General Sokolov, the Minister
of Defense, responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to
prepare for resumption of the operation (text of this correspondence is in Annex
1).
The Soviet and DRA military leadership were in damage control. A reinforcing
regiment each from the DRA 11th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the DRA 21st
Mechanized Infantry Brigade arrived along with the DRA 203rd Separate Spetsnaz
Battalion (special forces).(31)
The DRA 37th Commando Brigade arrived. Following urgent requests from the leadership
of the DRA, Varrenikov authorized five battalions of Soviet forces which were
sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April.(32)
Soviet Forward Air controllers were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air
Controllers in the infantry divisions and the reinforcing Soviet unit commanders
were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders.(33)
General-Lieutenant Azimi flew off to Kabul on "important business".
From Kabul, he issued orders to arrest the helicopter regiment commander, but
the commander was hiding. The helicopter pilots who landed the commandos in
Pakistan said that the commander of the commandos had ordered them to land where
they did.(34)
General-Lieutenant Gafur from the DRA Operations Section of the General Staff
replaced General-Lieutenant Azimi. The Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, General
-Major Yu. P. Grekov took command of the five Soviet battalions. General-Lieutenant
V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan)
assumed overall coordination of all the forces. They reworked the operations
plan while the force was refitted. The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600
men. Then Varrenikov himself arrived at the battlefield. DRA President Karmal
had requested that General of the Army V. I. Varrenikov take over as overall
commander of the operation.(35)
While this refitting, restructuring and replanning was going on, the communists
kept the pressure on the Mujahideen with air strikes and artillery. In first
battle for Zhawar, DRA/Soviet artillery and air strikes stopped at night, but
this time they were conducted around the clock. At night, they dropped aerial
flares for illumination. This heavy fire support continued for 12 days.(36)
The tempo of the air and artillery increased on the morning of 17 April.
"Soviet pilots showed a miraculous mastery and heroism. Many of us saw how the aircraft of LTC A. Rutskoy, the commander of the aviation regiment, was shot down....His aircraft seemed to draw all the air defense fire. He made four or five runs on the base and then we saw his plane dart and he then flashed from the mountain ridge into the valley. We felt, from the convulsive jerks, that the pilot was attempting to start his engine, but alas. The bang of the ejection seat rang out. The aircraft flew straight and level for a few seconds and then the nose dipped and the aircraft slammed into the ground and exploded somewhere in the vicinity of Barankhel. A BTR from the operations group of the 40th Army went and picked up the pilot."(37)
Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her border. The
Mujahideen lacked effective air defense against helicopter gunships, and the
strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance aircraft. The Mujahideen had
some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not
effective. Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take
out attacking aircraft with the British Blowpipe shoulder-fired missiles and
show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountain and firing thirteen
Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and his NCO were severely
wounded by the attacking aircraft.(38)
The renewed ground attack began on the morning of 17 April. The 25th Infantry
division led the assault in the west and the 14th Infantry Division led the
assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen and divert their forces,
the eastern group began its attack at 0630 and the western group began at 1030.(39)
The DRA 25th Infantry Division was concentrated at Lezhi. The Mujahideen had
fortified the Dawri Gar mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes
with accurate fire. Multiple attacks on the mountain failed. When the artillery
fire preparation would start, the Mujahideen would shelter in caves and when
the preparation ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions and repulsed
the attack. General-Major Asef, the DRA 25th Infantry Division Commander and
LTC Mikhail Karaev, his adviser, observed this. During the night, they silently
moved one of their regiments toward the summit and, at dawn, launched an attack
on the Mujahideen without any artillery preparation. The Mujahideen did not
expect this and faltered. The regiment captured the summit in a matter of minutes.(40)
The Mujahideen fell back from the Lezhi area into the higher mountains and slowly
the DRA/Soviet force moved through the Manay Kandow pass.
At the same time, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking column from the Lezhi
area that moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai mountain on
the east flank of Zhawar. There, a regiment of HIH Mujahideen waited in defense.
However, as the DRA column neared, the HIH regiment withdrew without a fight.
At the same time, Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. He had
head and facial wounds, but rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani was
dead. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar and moved high into surrounding mountains
as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar.(41)
The Mujahideen were unable to evacuate most of the stores from Zhawar. They
pulled out the two T-55 tanks and fought the advancing column for awhile before
abandoning the tanks in the foothills. LTC Kulenin, the adviser to the commander
of the DRA 21st Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a
T-55 round.(42)
The Soviet and DRA forces entered Zhawar. It was noon on 19 April 1986.
After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers. Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall. The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with powerful iron doors which were painted in bright colors. There were 41 caves in all. All had electricity. Behind a fence was a mosque with a beautiful brick entrance and a hospital with new medical equipment manufactured in the United States. They even had an ultra-sound machine which we moved to the Khost hospital. There was nickel-plated furniture including adjustable beds. There was a library with English-language and Farsi-language books. There was a bakery and by the entrance was a stack of fresh nan.(43) In the storage area, there were metal shelving units where boxes of arms and ammunition were neatly stacked. Further on, there was a storage cave for mines. There was every kind of mine imaginable: antitank, antivehicular, and antipersonnel mines from Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Hand grenade and artillery simulators were stored separately. The demolition explosives of various types and detonators were stored in a separate cave. In the very furthest part of the base were repair and maintenance bays complete with grease pits. There was a T-34 tank in one of them. The tank was serviced, fueled and had new batteries. It started right up and drove out of the service bay. Above the storage caves was a beautiful building marked "Hotel". There was overstuffed furniture inside and the floors were covered with carpets. How many of our aircraft had worked this site over and the hotel and caves were still intact.(44)
The Afghan soldiers began to loot the base. Even the two-meter high brick facing
wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25th Infantry Division at Khost.
The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar long enough for the Mujahideen
to organize a counterattack. The Mujahideen were moving MRL up to the Pakistan
border to fire on the communist forces.
Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar and had four hours to do
so. He split up the detonation of the caves and buildings between the sappers
of the 45th Engineer Regiment of the 40th Army and Afghan sappers. He knew that
he could not destroy the caves in the
available time. Above the caves was a 30-meter thick layer of rock. If they
could drill a one-to-two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, they could have
crammed that full of explosives and caused a collapse, but there was not time
to do that before the troops had to leave. So the sappers stacked about 200
antitank mines in the primary caves and rigged them for simultaneous electric
detonation. Even if they had laid in ten times more explosives, it would not
have made any difference since the force of the explosion would follow the path
of least resistance and the caves would channel the force out the caves' mouths.(45)
And the moment finally arrived. The caves ... shot out their contents. After the dust settled, all of the canyon was filled with clumps of earth, shattered bricks and stones. The caves were swept clean, but were somewhat larger and their entries were partially clogged by rock slides from above. The gates were torn pieces of iron laying at the foot of the opposite canyon wall. (46)
The combat soldiers were withdrawing as the sappers remained behind to mine
the base. The work was hard and complicated by the lack of time. The sappers
had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours, the command was given for the
remaining force to leave and head for Tani. The Mujahideen were quick to fall
on the heels of a retiring foe. Anyone who would fall behind or stop would be
in serious trouble. Rockets fired from across the Pakistan border were landing
near the sappers and these rounds were becoming more precise. It was time for
the sappers to join the exodus. Kutsenko gave the command to depart on his radio.
The Afghan sappers immediately quit working and boarded their armored vehicles.
The Soviet commander of the sappers from the 45th Engineer Regiment answered
"Right away". His "Right away" lasted 15 minutes. Kutsenko
again called him and ordered that they cease work and depart. Their commander
again answered "Right away". Kutsenko then I told him "You may
stay here for an hour, but your soldiers need to quickly join the convoy. The
Mujahideen are here and we are leaving." This time, the Soviet sappers
quit work and immediately boarded their vehicles. Kutsenko insured that everyone
was on board and the trail party left. Kutsenko sat in the captured tank and
returned to Tani on it.(47)
After 57 days of campaigning, the DRA held Zhawar for only five hours. In addition
to the standard mines and booby traps, the communist forces planted seismic-detonated
mines and sprinkled aerial-delivered butterfly bombs over the area. The Mujahideen
returned to Zhawar on the following day. The first Mujahideen to enter the area
were killed by seismic mines. The Mujahideen withdrew and fired mortars, BM12
and machine guns into the area to set off the seismic mines. Then they began
the slow process of finding the rest of the mines manually. The Mujahideen pushed
forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and other areas. Since the DRA was only
in Zhawar for five hours, the DRA did not manage to destroy the caves, but collapsed
some entrances. Weapons that were stored in some of the caves were still intact
and useable.(48)
Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and Soviet losses are unknown,
but the Mujahideen reportedly destroyed 24 helicopters, shot down two jets and
captured 530 personnel of the 38th Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen held a field
tribunal. Yunis Khalis and other Mujahideen commanders were the judges. They
tried and executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the 38th Commando
Brigade and another colonel who landed with the brigade to adjust artillery
fire. There were 78 other officers among the prisoners. They were given a chance
to confess to their crimes from different battles and then all the officers
were executed. All the soldiers were given amnesty since they were conscripts
who were forced to fight. The amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years
of labor service in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics,
were "reeducated" and released after two years.
The withdrawal of the HIH regiment, coupled with the rumors of Haqani's death,
greatly aided the DRA victory. Haqani's loss, besides affecting Mujahideen morale,
cost the Mujahideen what little command and control they had left at this juncture
of the battle. The DRA failed to throw a blocking force on the Miram Shah road,
although they knew that Mujahideen reinforcements were moving along this route.
As a minimum, they could have employed scatterable mines on the road, but they
left the route open.
Clearly there were intelligence failures on both sides. The DRA and Soviets
had ample opportunity to collect on Zhawar, but failed to determine the basic
outline of the Mujahideen defenses and their manning. The DRA and Soviets never
detected the presence of the Mujahideen regiment that slipped away at the crucial
juncture and allowed their victory. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, should
have been aware that Zhawar was at risk since the DRA had been moving forces
toward the Khost valley for some forty days. Yet, the leadership of Zhawar was
out of country during the lengthy build-up. The usual Mujahideen sources failed
to tip them off as to the start time of the assault or the air assault. And,
although the pathfinder commando element that landed in Pakistan was overrun
by Mujahideen, these Mujahideen did not get the word to Zhawar. The Zhawar defenders
were surprised by the air assault of the commando main body.
The DRA and Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time in order
to do a thorough job of destroying the base is a strong testament to the ability
of the Mujahideen to threaten their lines of communication. The commanders had
no desire to risk being trapped in Zhawar and having to mount yet another operation
to fight their way in and out of Zhawar. Their reserves were committed and the
danger was real.
The DRA celebrated the fall of Zhawar with parades and medals as a major victory.
But Zhawar was back in full operation within weeks of the attack. Having been
trapped in the caves, the Mujahideen learned to make connecting tunnels between
caves. They reopened the caves and built connecting tunnels. The caves were
improved and lengthened to 400-500 meters long.(49)
In retrospect, the battles of Zhawar seem to have been exercises in futility,
but at the time, they were considered tests of whether the DRA could stand up
to the Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal.
Annex 1: Correspondence between General Varrenikov and General Sokolov
SECRET(URGENT)
USSR Ministry
of Defense
To Marshal of the Soviet Union
Comrade S. L. Sokolov
I report.
Preliminary results from the combat conducted by the Afghan Army in the region
of Khost may be evaluated as unsatisfactory, although the Mujahideen suffered
significant personnel and weapons losses.
Reasons
1. The forces and aviation assigned to the operation were poorly trained and
the personnel had poor morale and fighting spirit. The combat potential of the
divisions was weak and their potential was very limited. Further, the commanders
of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry Divisions and, especially, the commander of
the 3rd Corps were completely unprepared to lead their forces.
2. At the start of the operation, there was an incomplete intelligence picture
and a wrong estimate of enemy strength. Enemy strength was much greater than
determined. The close proximity of Pakistan allowed the enemy complete maneuverability
and the unimpeded capability to replace personnel and weapons losses. Further,
the Mujahideen were able to use strong fire support from the territory of Pakistan.
This was particularly true against our forces moving along the border.
Young, well-trained, steadfast Pakistanis participated directly in the battle
in the base region of Zhawar and Miram Shah (south of Khost).
3. This was an unfortunate time of year to conduct combat. A more advantageous
time would have been in January to the start of February or in April. The end
of February and March are characterized by an abundance of rain mixed with snow
(particularly this year). This forced the troops to move through the thawed
mud along the existing road under enemy fire.
4. The difficult weather, length of the combat (30 days) and the "uncomfortable"
column formation forced on the troops in their advance to the international
border exhausted the troops and led to low morale. The short preparation time
for combat in Khost from 31 March to 4 April did not revitalize the forces.
5. During the course of combat, the leadership tolerated nonobjective estimates
of the situation, false situation reports and false combat reports. As a result,
they were unable to provide the necessary picture of the situation.
6. There were mistakes in the conduct of the assault landing. The planning was
conducted correctly. However, the practical application was organized unsatisfactorily.
Because of this, the assault force was scattered over LZs located four to 20
kilometers from their planned LZs and this allowed the Mujahideen to defeat
the air assault in the course of a day. The preparation of the helicopter crew
navigators was unsatisfactory and they were poorly oriented on the terrain during
the landing. They only had bearings and times of flight. These were the main
reasons for the errors.
Measures that were taken
1. Additional massive air and artillery strikes were planned and conducted on
strong points and pin-pointed enemy firing points. The "Shleyf" round
was employed (on the approaches to the base, strong points equipped with cement
structures, and armored cupolas of dug-in tanks).
2. Reinforcing units were moved into the combat zone. These included the 50th
Infantry Regiment from the 18th Infantry Division, the 81st Infantry Regiment
from the 11th Infantry Division, an infantry regiment from the 21st Mechanized
Infantry Brigade and a battalion of spetsnaz.
Soviet forces were moved to support the Afghan forces. These included two battalions
from a separate air assault brigade and two battalions from a separate parachute
regiment.
3. All types of intelligence collection were reinforced, particularly that directed
against the Zhadran tribe.
4. The leadership of the Afghan forces was reinforced. With this goal, General-Lieutenant
Azimi (who was ill) was replaced by General-Lieutenant Gafur to direct the battle....
The Army Chief of Staff directed the 40th Army units. Overall coordination of
all the forces was provided by General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations
Group of the Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan).
Preventive Measures (lessons learned)
1. It is necessary to take radical measures to replenish the personnel in the
Afghan Army (particularly in the 1st and 3rd Army Corps). Right now, the line
strength of the combat divisions is 200-300 men....
5. Refrain from conducting large-scale independent actions by the Afghan forces,
particularly those that last a long time or are conducted far from their garrisons.
Combat must not exceed 10-12 days.
6. The forces must not conduct actions against Mujahideen bases located close
to the border or in a region where it is impossible to isolate the enemy from
the arrival of his reserves. These regions should be subjected to massive aviation
strikes, dropping powerful bombs, scatterable mines, etc.
Further actions
....Consider that the result of the conduct of military actions will convey
a significant military-political ideal, it is expedient to increase the aviation
strikes to the maximum, to destroy enemy points and simultaneously take measures
to train the Afghan forces for decisive battle....
Varrenikov
April 1986(50)
The Minister of Defense of the USSR replied with the following order to the
Operations Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan:
Secret
First Deputy
Chief of the General Staff
General of the Army
Comrade V. I. Varrenikov
Chief Military Adviser in the DRA
General-Colonel
Comrade V. A. Vostrov
The Chief Military Adviser in the DRA and his operatives were mistaken in their
estimate of the size of the enemy groupings and their potential in Paktia Province.
During the preparation for combat, they did not consider the changes which had
occurred since 1985 in that region. The Mujahideen have received new weapons
and equipment and learned from the experience of the 1985 strike in that region.
The timing of the operation was a mistake. In the course of the operation, neither
the new Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, General-Colonel V. A. Vostrov, nor
the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense took the necessary measures
in order to correct the errors in a timely manner.
I demand:
1. The conduct of a comprehensive estimate of the correlation of forces assembled
in the region of Khost. Improve intelligence activities against the enemy. Conduct
air strikes based on targets identified by intelligence and cease area bombing.
2. Organize troop control. Subordinate the reinforcing units brought from the
center of the country to the appropriate division commanders before accepting
combat again.
3. If necessary, delay your offensive actions for several days. Ready the units
and subunits of the Afghan forces for the upcoming combat. Replenish their ammunition
and material stocks and clarify their combat missions. Organize coordination
with aviation.
4. Your plan for the conduct of future combat will be present for confirmation
by 17 April.
Sokolov
312/1/07 sh
April 1986(51)
Endnotes
1. Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative Seminar, Monterey, California, November 1993.
2. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, to be published in 1998, xvii and Chapter 11, page 1.
3. Interviews with participants Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani in Jalali and Grau, chapter 11.
4. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, London: Leo Cooper, 168.
5. Ibid, 111.
6. Ibid. 159.
7. General Shahnawaz Tani was from the neighboring town of Tani and enjoyed some popular support in the area. He later became DRA Defense Minister.
8. Omar and Haqani.
9. Perhaps this was a reconnaissance in force.
10. Local name for the chalk layers in the rock which mark this saddle.
11. Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya i doblest' Afgana [The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghan Veterans], Moscow: Iskona, 1995, 300-301.
12. General of the Army Valentin Leonidovich Varrenikov was head of the operations group of the Soviet Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan from 1985-1989.
13. Viktor Kutsenko, "Dzhavara" [Zhawar], Soldat udachi [Soldier of fortune], July 1996, 24. Soldat udachi is affiliated with the American Soldier of Fortune magazine and does translate and print some articles on weapons and warfare from its parent magazine, but is an editorially-independent magazine that has enjoyed popularity in Russia and serves as a publishing outlet for veterans from Afghanistan, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Some 60% of its articles are written by Russians.
14. Lyakhovskiy, 301.
15. Ibid.
16. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovskiy, 307-308.
17. Kutsenko, 24.
18. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the 191 Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment stationed in Gazni.
19. Lyakhovksiy, 301.
20. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 306-309.
21. The maximum size this force could have been was sixty men , since the Mi-8 could lift ten fully-equipped men at this altitude.
22. Kutsenko, 24-25.
23. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
24. Following Zhawar Two, the 38th Commando Brigade became the base of the newly-formed 2nd Division. Casualty figures vary. The Soviet figures are 312 landed of which 25 survived. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309.
25. Most probably, these were KAB-1500L-PR laser-guided bombs launched from the SU-25 ground attack aircraft. The KAB-1500L-PR carries a 1100 kilogram (2425 pound) warhead and can penetrate two meters of reinforced concrete buried in 20 meters of soil. It has a one-two meter CEP (circular error probable). Yuri Zuenko and Sergey Korostelev, Boevye samolety Rossii [Russian Combat Aircraft], Moscow: ELAKOS, 1994, 170-171.
26. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
27. Ibid.
28. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309.
29. Ibid
30. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
32. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment stationed at Bagram, the 4th Battalion of the 56th Air Assault Brigade and another battalion of this brigade stationed at Gardez and 2nd Battalion of the 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment stationed in Ghazni. The airborne and air assault battalions flew in Khost airfield while the Motorized Rifle Battalion drove into Tani.
33. Lyakhovski, 301.
34. Kutsenko, 25.
36. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
37. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 310. At the end of 1988, Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, who was by then the deputy to the 40th Army Commander for aviation, was flying in this same region and was again shot down-this time with an air-to-air missile. He landed in Pakistan and was captured. He was ransomed by the Soviet government. He was decorated with the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union". Later, Rutskoy entered politics and became the Vice President of the Russian Federation. However, in October 1993, he lead the opposition to Russian Federation President Yeltsin. He was arrested. In February 1994, we was freed from imprisonment by decree of the Duma of the Russian Federation.
38. Yousaf and Adkin, 171 and interviews conducted by Ali Jalali with Mujahideen in the fall of 1996. Mr. Jalali's sources chose to remain anonymous since they were sworn to secrecy at the time.
39. Lyakhovski, 305.
40. Kutsenko, 25.
41. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
42.Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 311.
43. Nan is an unleavened oval-shaped flatbread, ranging in size from a small to a regular pizza.
44. Kutsenko, 25-26.
45. Ibid, 26.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
49. Veterans of Zhawar have proposed to Haqani that the caves
be restored and kept as a museum so that 200 years from now, people can visit
them and reflect on their heritage. From 7-9 May 1990, 47 major Mujahideen field
commanders from all over Afghanistan met at Zhawar in the first united of all
major commanders of all factions. The purpose was to chart post-Soviet military
strategy. Zhawar was chosen for the conference for its symbolic importance.
Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin, Peshawar, May 1990.
50. Lyakhovski, 302-303.
51. Ibid, 304.